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Abstract
This paper considers migration as an investment decision.  It develops a continuous-
time stochastic model to explain the optimal timing of migration, in the presence of
ongoing uncertainty over wage differentials.  The results show that individuals prefer
to wait before migrating, even if the present value of the wage differential is positive,
because of the uncertainty and the sunk costs associated with migration.  An increased
degree of risk aversion discourages migration, and interacts with the other variables
and parameters affecting migration by exacerbating their effects.
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11. Introduction
The conventional theories of migration for developing countries (Lewis, 1954,
Todaro, 1969, and Harris and Todaro, 1970) require the existence of a dual labour
market as fundamental to the industrialisation process, which was seen as the main
vehicle for rapid growth.  These theories rest on the assumption of a clearly defined
duality in the labour market.  The agricultural sector is defined as inefficient with low
wages, while the industrial sector, usually urban based, is viewed as modern and
technologically advanced with typically higher wages.  Migration is therefore the
mechanism by which wages in the two sectors eventually equalize.  Once the rural-
urban wage gap is eroded, migration ceases.
However, the very presence of a wage gap, central to the commonly accepted theories
of migration, has been called into question (see for example Kanappan, 1985).
Migration does occur in the absence of a positive income differential suggesting that
income differences in themselves do not constitute a necessary condition for
migration.
In addition, numerous studies have shown that the expected income hypothesis for
rural-urban migration is not supported by empirical evidence (Banerjee and Kanbur,
1981;  Salvatore, 1981;  Garrison, 1982).  The main economic argument for rural-
urban migration is that individuals migrate to take advantage of a positive wage
differential but the evidence shows that, even in the presence of a positive wage
differential, people do not always migrate.  It would appear then that income
differences in themselves do not constitute a sufficient condition to motivate
migration.
More recently, Stark (1984, 1991) understood that an alternative explanation was
needed to analyse migration behaviour in terms other than just the inter-sectoral wage
gap.  The application of relative deprivation to the migration decision seems to fit the
stylised facts of observed migration behaviour.  However, the difficulty with relative
deprivation is that whilst migration may be motivated by a desire to feel relatively
better off, there is the real possibility that migrants may end up being worse-off in
2absolute terms.  In the limit, the relative deprivation approach would imply that
migration only ceases when there is no intra-village inequality.
Additionally, in many developing countries, e.g. India, it is rural-rural migration that
accounts for a significant proportion of total migration flows (see Skeldon, 1986, and
Sundaram, 1989).  Given that, conventionally, no duality is assumed between rural
labour markets, an important question is why rural-rural migration occurs on the scale
it does.  The model developed in this paper does not require the presence of a dual
labour market to explain the migration decision.
Most of the work on migration tends to consider migration returns in one direction,
even though there is the possibility that things in the destination area might go wrong.
Thus, the consideration of return migration in the initial outward migration decision is
very important.  Most theories of return migration show that the marginal utility of
consumption in the area of origin is greater than that in the destination area (see Stark
et al., 1997, and Dustmann, 1997).  Several studies show that there can be
considerable returns to returning (Co, Gang and Yun, 2000, for instance, look at
return migration to Hungary).
If the rural-urban wage differential is subject to fluctuations, then reverse migration
flows are likely following a severe economic downturn associated with one particular
area.  Hatton and Williamson (1992) noted, in their study of US economic history,
that reductions in the urban-rural wage ratio in the late 1920s was marked by
migration back into agriculture.  The very fact that return migration is possible, albeit
at a cost, could make it easier for individuals to bring forward their decision to
migrate in the first place.
This paper models migration behaviour in a general framework as an investment
decision under uncertainty (see Burda, 1995).  The individual migration decision is
analysed in the rural-rural context of developing countries.  The motivation for this
stems from seeking to explain why large numbers of people move from one rural area
to another, given that there may be no significant differences in their underlying
economic structures.  Simply, if wages in two rural areas display a similar trend, then
why migrate?
3The paper adopts a general approach to uncertainty.  It can be considered that
migrants will be reluctant to move, given prolonged uncertainty over the wage
differential.  Initially, the information set of the migrant is limited to uncertainty over
the wage differential.  The migrant does not know the primary source of uncertainty.
However, the analysis is extended so that the migrant’s information set identifies the
source of uncertainty, by applying a neutral spread to the stochastic process for the
destination wage, thus allowing for a more general approach than the traditional
mean-variance analysis.
A key result of this model is that, even if agents are risk neutral, uncertainty plays a
critical role in the migration decision.  An increased degree of risk aversion interacts
with the other parameters that influence the migration decision by exacerbating their
effects.  This is in contrast with the predictions of the Todaro-type framework, where
it is only under risk aversion that migrants incorporate uncertainty into their decision-
making.
The next section motivates and presents a model of the migration decision under
uncertainty.  Section 3 applies a neutral spread to the stochastic process describing the
wage in the area of origin.  Section 4 extends the model to consider risk aversion.
Section 5 concludes.
42. The model
2.1. Motivation
The analytical root to this paper derives principally from work done on real options
(see Dixit, 1991, and Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).  Migration is modelled as an
investment that can therefore be compared to most other forms of investment.  The
investment-making unit, in this case the potential migrant, must consider future
expected payoffs and balance these against the costs incurred in undertaking the
investment.  Given the irreversibility of the sunk costs associated with the investment,
future payoffs must offset these costs.  Under migration, the future expected payoffs
derive from the future income streams in the destination area while the sunk costs
derive from the initial cost of migration, including for example travel and
accommodation costs, and the search costs involved in finding a job.
For the individual migrant, the decision involved in migration is not just of whether to
migrate, but when.  Individuals may choose to wait before moving.  There is a value
to waiting that arises from two aspects.  First, waiting allows the migrant to protect
herself from ‘bad news’, that is, the wage differential could decline in the future.
Second, the sunk cost may be lower if the migrant waits.  The individual information
set of the migrant may change as a result of established networks that would
ultimately impact on search costs, accommodation and living costs, etc.
The timing of migration is influenced by two aspects:  (1)  the value of waiting for the
outward migration decision, and (2)  the possibility of return migration.  For example,
an individual migrant may be more willing to leave his or her village in the
knowledge that she can always return to her home village if things go wrong,
provided the cost of return migration can be covered.  While sunk costs are
irreversible, the act of migration is not.
The inclusion of uncertainty in the evaluation of future expected pay-offs means that
migration may be regarded as a strategy to limit the ongoing uncertainties associated
with a particular wage, in which case the presence of a wage differential in itself is
not therefore necessary to induce migration.  Greater uncertainty associated with, say,
5the destination wage compared to the wage in the area of origin means that outward
migration is subject to delay while return migration may be hastened.  The uncertainty
must be prolonged over time for migration decisions to be influenced.  Transitory
uncertainties are unlikely to result in migration in either direction, outward or return.
Groote and Tassenaar (2000), for instance, show in their study of nineteenth century
rural Netherlands that short-run stresses did not result in out-migration, because of the
existence of buffer mechanisms to lessen the effects of temporary adverse shocks.
Although migration in this paper is modelled as an individual decision, in practice
migration decisions are not always entirely individual.  Whilst the act of migration
may be undertaken on an individual basis, the actual decision to migrate could be
made at the household level.  How this decision is arrived at, and who actually
migrates, depend on the interactions among the family members.  Even when the unit
of analysis is the selfish individual, it can be considered that this decision too is the
outcome of household interactions.  Although the process of internal decision-making
within the household is not explored in this paper, the analysis would still apply for a
household characterised by both income pooling and no divergence of preferences of
individual household members.
2.2. Structure of the model
This section presents a continuous-time model of migration where the wage
differential evolves in a stochastic manner over time and where there is ongoing
uncertainty.  The model assumes symmetry in the wage profile between the area of
origin and the area of destination.  This is done to consider rural-rural migration,
where there may not be a systematic divergence in the wage trends in two areas.  The
optimal decision rule for an individual to migrate in either direction is derived.
It is shown that the predictions of standard Marshallian microeconomic analysis do
not hold when the net present value of the wage differential is positive.  Migration
only occurs when the net present value of the wage differential is sufficiently large to
compensate for the irreversibility of the sunk costs.  A correct measure of the net
6present value must include both the sunk costs and the value of holding the option to
migrate.
The cost of initial migration is I, and E is the cost of return migration.  WO is the wage
in the village of origin, WD the destination wage.  The exponential of the wage
differential, 
OD WWeV −≡ , is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion:
(1) vvVdzdV σ=
where σv > 0 measures the variability of the wage differential.  Equation (1) implies
that dV is proportional to the existing level of the wage differential, rather than
independent of it as would be the case with a simple Brownian motion.  Moreover,
equation (1) excludes the possibility that the stochastic process for the wage
differential might have the origin as an absorbing state.  In economic terms, this
means that there can be negative values of the wage differentials, and that zero is not
an absorbing state.  This is particularly important for modelling return migration,
where the wage differential may well be negative.
Equation (1) implies that today’s wage differential is the best predictor for
tomorrow’s wage differential.  Hence, the stochastic trend in wages is the same for
both the home village and destination village.  The component vdz  in (1) is a Wiener
disturbance defined as dtttdz vv ⋅= )()( ε , where )(tvε ~ )1,0(N  is a white noise
stochastic process (see Cox and Miller, 1965).  The Wiener component vdz  is
therefore normally distributed with zero expected value and variance equal to dt:
vdz ~ ),0( dtN .
For analytical simplicity, it is assumed that there is no uncertainty over I and E 1.
Two migration rules can be identified for the individual:
(a). Optimal migration rule for an individual in the village of origin.
(b). Optimal migration rule for an individual the village of destination.
7Solution to (a).
The individual will remain in the village of origin as long as the wage differential is
less than a critical value, and will migrate as soon as this critical value is reached.
The relevant range for V is ),0( HVV ∈ .  As the wage differential tends to minus
infinity, V approaches zero.  The individual will remain in the village of origin for
HVV < , and will migrate when HVV = .
The value to the individual of holding the option to migrate is FO:
(2) )()( VFeFF OWWOO
OD
==
− ),0( HVV ∈
The Bellman equation (or the asset equation) for the dynamic programme of the
individual is defined as:
)]([)( VdFEdtWdtVrF OOO +=
or:
(3) )( OOO dFEdtWdtrF +=
where r is the instantaneous rate of interest.  Equation (3) requires that the annuity
value of the asset (LHS) be equal to the sum of the instantaneous benefit and the
expected capital gain or loss from the asset (RHS).
From the Appendix, the solution for )(VF O  is:
(4)
r
WVAVF
O
O += 11)(
β ),0( HVV ∈
where β1 is given by (see Appendix):
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1 Uncertainty over I and E is examined in Khwaja (2001).
8and where A1 is a constant.  Equation (4) shows that the value of remaining in the
village of origin is the sum of the value of the option to migrate, 11
βVA  and the
present value of the expected future income streams, rW O .  The value of the option
to migrate is an increasing function of V.  As the wage differential increases, holding
the option to migrate becomes increasingly valuable until such time when V=VH,
when the option is exercised.  The critical parameter β1 is an increasing function of
the rate of interest r and a decreasing function of the variability of the wage
differential, 2vσ .
Solution to (b).
The individual will remain in the destination village as long as the wage differential is
greater than a critical value, and will migrate as soon as this critical value is reached.
The relevant range for V is ),( ∞∈ LVV .  The individual will remain in the village of
destination for LVV >  and will migrate when LVV = .
The Bellman equation is:
(5) )( DDD dFEdtWdtrF +=
A general solution of the form:
(6)
r
WVCVF
D
D += 22)(
β ),( +∞∈ LVV
is obtained, where C2 is a constant  and where
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(see Appendix).  Equation (6) shows that the value of remaining in the village of
destination is the sum of the value of the option to return migrate, 22
βVC  and the
present value of the expected future income streams, rW D .  The value of the option
to return migrate is a decreasing function of V.  The critical parameter β2 is a
9decreasing function of the rate of interest r and an increasing function of the
variability of the wage differential, 2vσ .
The value matching and smooth pasting conditions are used to determine A1 and C2
(see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).  The value matching conditions equate the values of
the alternative options, open to the decision maker at each critical boundary.  Thus:
(7a) IVFVF HDHO −= )()(
(7b) EVFVF LOLD −= )()(
Equation (7a) shows that, for a given VH, an individual in the village of origin must be
indifferent between remaining in the village and migrating to the destination village,
whereby it will incur a cost I.  Similarly, equation (7b) shows that, for a given VL, an
individual in the destination village must be indifferent between remaining in the
village and return migrating, whereby it will incur a cost E.
The smooth pasting conditions equate the marginal changes of the individual value
functions, at each one the critical boundaries.  Equations (8a) and (8b) show that, at
the critical boundaries, the individual value functions for the village of origin and for
the village of destination must be tangential to each other:
(8a) )()( HDv
HO
v VFVF =
(8b) )()( LOv
LD
v VFVF =
2.3. Results
The optimal migration strategy for an individual involves the identification of a
critical value of the wage differential at which it becomes optimal to migrate.  This
value is, in general dependent, on the location of the migrant.  The value VH marks the
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critical threshold level for out-migration, whereas VL marks the critical threshold level
for return migration.  The following proposition is demonstrated in the Appendix.
Proposition 1.
There exists a non-singular interval (VL, VH) of the logarithm of the wage differential
in which migration does not occur in either direction.  The ratio VH/VL is an increasing
function of the variance of the wage differential, σv2, and of the migration costs I and
E.
There is a range of values of the wage differential, VL < V < VH, in which it is optimal
for an individual to maintain the status quo.  Individuals do not migrate in either
direction and are reluctant to respond to small changes in the wage differential,
preferring to wait until the wage gap is large enough for migration to be an optimal
strategy.  The presence of the non-singular interval (VL, VH) corroborates the
empirical evidence that a positive wage gap is not a sufficient condition for migration
to occur.
This version of the model assumes that the trends in wages in the region of origin and
in the region of destination are symmetrical (i.e. there is no systematic divergence in
the evolution of wages over time).  However, if the model is extended so that there is
an asymmetry in the trends in wages, then migration could occur even in the absence
of a positive wage gap (Khwaja, 2001).  Therefore, a positive wage gap would not be
a necessary condition for migration.
Increased uncertainty associated with the wage differential will effectively delay
migration in either direction.  The analytical results in the Appendix show that z is an
increasing function of σv2.  Faced with increased uncertainty, migrants prefer to adopt
a strategy of “wait and see”.  The numerical calibrations in Table 1 show that
increases in uncertainty result in very large increases in the region of inertia, which
suggests that migration behaviour is extremely sensitive to uncertainty.
The critical variable z is also an increasing function of I and E, the costs of initial and
return migration respectively.  The interval (VL, VH) describing the region of inertial
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behaviour widens.  It should be noted that I and E exert a symmetrical effect on the
region of inertia.
The rate of interest r does not exert a monotonic influence on the size of the region of
inertia, as the numerical calibrations in Table 1 illustrate.  For small values of r the
region of inertia narrows, whereas for larger values of r migrants are more reluctant to
move.  The reason for this result can be explained in terms of equations (4) and (6).
The individual value function consists of two components:  the present value of future
wage earnings in the current location and the value of the option of waiting.  The first
component is always a declining function of r.  The second component can be an
increasing function of r.  For smaller values of the rate of interest the first component
dominates, whereas for larger values of the interest rate it is the second component
that dominates.
The relationship between interest rates and migration is complex.  Rose (2000) shows
that investment is a hump-shaped function of r.  From Table 1 it can be seen that the
size of the region of inertia in migration decisions is a U-shaped function of the rate of
interest.  It should be noted, however, that the quantitative effect of increased
uncertainty impacts more heavily on migration behaviour than the rate of interest.
Uncertainty matters.  The information set of the migrant is limited:  the source of
uncertainty is not identified.  There may be uncertainty about the origin wage, the
destination wage, or both.  The migrant is not able to ascertain which wage is
associated with the greatest uncertainty.  The net effect is that the migrant displays
caution given this limited information set.  Section 3 provides a more precise
characterisation of the precise source of uncertainty.
The results on inertial behaviour in migration decisions bear close similarity to the
predictions of labour demand theory, where increases in hiring and firing costs make
the firm more reluctant to hire or fire labour in response to fluctuations in demand for
its output (see Bentolila and Bertola, 1990).  During a recession, firms are reluctant to
fire workers if the decline in demand is perceived to be temporary.  Firing workers
would increase the costs of the firm, as redundancy obligations in the form of
severance pay would need to be met.  Moreover, once the recession is over the firm
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would incur hiring costs.  However, if firms believe the recession to be long term,
workers are fired.
The costs of migration and of return migration can be considered as analogous to the
hiring and firing costs of the firm.  A small wage differential that is expected to be
permanent will generate a large present value.  In this case, an individual is willing to
take part in migration and incur the cost I of leaving the village of origin, or the cost E
of returning.  If individuals observe a large positive wage differential but expect it to
be transitory they are unlikely to migrate.  Equally, a large negative differential that is
expected to be transitory will not prompt return migration.
3. Rural-rural migration and uncertainty on the wage differential
How well individual income can be maintained in the face of adverse shocks can be
an important determinant of migration.  Rural areas that are predominantly
agricultural can suffer from huge variations in income.  The adoption of new
technology and/or state-funded rural investment in non-agricultural activities may be
a means for reducing the instability of agricultural income, and can also result in
fundamental changes in the structure of the rural area.  This is certainly been the case
in China, where Fujian Province has experienced an urbanization of its rural areas
through the development of village enterprises and investment (see Zhu, 2000).
Large-scale investment may therefore serve as a means to reduce wage differentials
and so stem the rural-urban flow, which has reached critical levels in many urban
centres in developing countries.  The effect of any investment in the rural area is
twofold.  First, wages may be raised over the long run.  Second, there may be a
reduction in the uncertainty associated with the rural wage.  Both these effects may
change the underlying structure of a particular rural area, and could stimulate intra-
rural migration.  This of course suggests that there may be an asymmetry in the wage
levels of two rural areas.  However, intra-rural migration flows may also occur
between two structurally similar areas, in which case there is no such asymmetry.
Migration therefore is motivated by something other than the wage gap.  Reduced
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uncertainty, as part of a strategy to stabilise long-term income, could account for
some intra-rural flows.
Rural-rural migration is analysed by considering a neutral spread of the stochastic
process of the destination wage (see Ingersoll and Ross, 1992, for an application to
finance).  Consider an initial stochastic process and transform it by adding
uncorrelated random noise, which has the effect of increasing the variability of the
destination wage.  The initial destination wage and the transformed destination wage
both yield the same net present value.  A migrant will prefer to move to the
destination that gives greater security in terms of future expected incomes.  It is
shown that the addition of a neutral spread to the destination wage process raises the
critical threshold value of the wage differential at which it is optimal to migrate.
Increased uncertainty in the destination wage has the effect of delaying the time at
which it is optimal to migrate.
It should be noted that the migrant now associates the destination wage with greater
uncertainty relative to the wage in the area of origin.  It is assumed that the only
source of uncertainty lies with the destination wage.  By contrast, in the previous
section individuals are unaware of the source of uncertainty, and are thus more
reluctant to undertake migration in either direction.  However, if uncertainty can be
traced to a particular location, then this could result in out-migration away from the
area and reduced levels of migration into the area.
The increase in the uncertainty associated with the wage in the destination area can be
modelled as a neutral spread of the stochastic process describing the destination wage,
WD.  A neutral spread can be regarded as the dynamic extension to stochastic
processes of the mean-preserving spread for static random variables.  The analysis of
a mean-preserving spread is known to lead to a more satisfactory examination of risk
than the mean-variance approach, since the latter only applies to statistical
distributions that are fully characterised by the by their first and second moments
(Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970;  see also Laffont, 1991, chapter 2).
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The stochastic process describing the destination wage ∞
=0)}({ t
D tW  is augmented by
an uncorrelated white noise stochastic process, ∞
=0)}({ tth .  The destination wage after
the neutral spread becomes:
(9) )()()( thtWtW DhD +=
where the neutral spread is such that its expectation is equal to zero and its increments
are uncorrelated with the increments of the process WD:  0][ =hE , 0],[ =dhdWE D .
In order to assess the impact of the neutral spread on the decision to migrate, the value
to the individual of having the migration opportunity before and after the neutral
spread is computed.  For analytical simplicity, and without essential loss of generality,
the option to return migrate is not considered in the present section.  It is possible to
show that a neutral spread increases the value to the individual of keeping open the
option to migrate in the future.
Let Ft be the value at time t = 0 of the opportunity to migrate at time t ≥ 0 before the
spread:
(10) [ ]






−
∫
=
−
IWeEF Dt
dssr
t
t
)(PV0
)(
and let F be the value at time t = 0 of the opportunity to migrate at any time t ≥ 0
before the spread:
(11) t
t
FF
0
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≥
=
Let now Fth be the value at time t = 0 of the opportunity to migrate at time t ≥ 0 after
the spread:
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and let Fh be the value at time t = 0 of the opportunity to migrate at any time t ≥ 0
after the spread:
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The following definition is made:  )max( arg* tFt = , that is, tt FF ≥* , 0≥∀t .  It
follows that:
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(14) = F
where the second line of (14) follows from equation (12), the third line from the
definition of neutral spread (9), the fourth line from the additivity property of the
expectation operator, the fifth line from 0][ =hE , and finally the last line follows
from the definitions (10) and (11).
The following proposition has therefore been proved.
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Proposition 2.
A neutral spread to the stochastic distribution of the wage in the destination area
increases the value to the individual of keeping the option open to migrate in the
future.
The proof of Proposition 2 shows that a neutral spread increases the value to the
individual of keeping open the option to migrate.  It should be noted that this result
would be enhanced under risk aversion.  This issue is explored in the next section.
4. Migration and risk aversion
For a risk averse individual, the opportunity cost attached to migrating now is higher
than under risk neutrality.  Thus, it is expected that risk averse individuals display a
greater degree of inertial behaviour in migration.
Under risk aversion, instantaneous individual utility can be modelled as:
(15) )(WUU =
where U is increasing and concave, such that  U’ > 0, U” < 0.  Proceeding as in
section 2, the optimal migration strategy must have the form:  do not migrate if
*),0( VV ∈ , migrate if )*,[ ∞∈ VV .  The solution for the individual value function is
(see appendix):
(16)
r
WUVAVF
O )()( 11 +=
β *),0( VV ∈
The values of the coefficient A1 and of the critical threshold V* are obtained from the
value-matching and the smooth-pasting condition.  It is possible to show that (see
appendix):
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Equation (17) shows that an increase in the cost of migration, I, will increase the
critical value V* and thus delay the decision to migrate.  This is because the region
where it is optimal not to migrate has widened.  Similarly,
(18) 0
*/)](')("[
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∂∂ββ
Equation (18) shows that an increase in the rate of interest, r, also has the effect of
delaying migration.  This finding is consistent with intuition, in that one would expect
high interest rates to act as a deterrent in the migration decision.
To evaluate the response of V* to changes in the variance of the instantaneous shocks,
2
vσ , note that (see appendix):
(19) 0*2 >
vd
dV
σ
⇔ rIWUWU OD >− )()(
Suppose WO > WD:  in the absence of stochastic shocks, it would never be profitable
to migrate since rIWUWU OD <− )()( .  With positive shocks, as the variance σ v2
increases there is an increased probability that the wage of destination WD will climb
above the wage of origin WO, and therefore migration would be more attractive.  This
would result in a decline of the critical value V* (the set of values of V for which
migration is not optimal will be smaller).  Conversely, when rIWUWU OD >− )()(
an increase in the variance of the stochastic shocks will make it more likely for the
destination wage to fall below the wage of origin, thereby discouraging migration.
The intuition for this result can be explained by analogy to an American-type
financial option.  If WO > WD, individuals would own an option that is currently out-
of-the-money.  Under certainty (i.e., σ v2  = 0), the option would be worthless.  Under
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uncertainty (i.e., when σ v2  > 0), there is a positive probability that the option would
eventually be in-the-money (net of the costs), in which case it can be profitably
exercised.
Consider now the effect of an increase in the degree of risk aversion on the decision to
migrate.  The coefficient of relative risk aversion is defined as usual as (see e.g.
Laffont, 1991, page 24):
)('
)(")(
WU
WUWW ⋅−=γ
where 0>γ  for a risk-averse individual.  The appendix proves the following result:
Proposition 3.
The effects on V* of changes in the parameters I, r and 2vσ  are magnified by the
presence of positive risk aversion.
The importance of this result is twofold.  Firstly, it allows us to establish the role of
risk aversion in the decision-making process.  For instance, section 2 showed that an
increase in migration cost I makes the individual more reluctant to migrate, by raising
the critical threshold V*.  In the presence of risk aversion, the critical value V* is
raised even further by increases in I.  Risk aversion therefore exacerbates the effects
of those parameters that affect migration.  In other words, the qualitative effects are
unchanged, but the quantitative effects are stronger.
Secondly, the degree of risk aversion implicitly captures a source of heterogeneity
across individuals.  This could explain why some individuals are more likely to
migrate than others, even if their income and cost profiles are the same.  That is, for
any particular wage differential, a more risk averse individual will display a greater
degree of inertial behaviour.
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5. Conclusions
This paper develops a migration model where individuals incorporate uncertainty into
their decision.  It is shown that increased uncertainty over the wage differential
reduces the propensity to migrate.  Individuals require a net present value of the
expected wage differential to more than offset the cost of migration.  The possibility
of return is explicitly included in the initial migration decision.  There exists a region
of inertia over which no migration takes place.  Whilst wage differentials are
important, they are neither necessary nor sufficient to motivate migration.  Individuals
may consider migration as a strategy to overcome the uncertainties of the wage profile
in a particular location.  Under risk aversion, the effects of the parameters that
influence migration are magnified.
While the analysis presented here considers only intra-rural migration flows, the
model may be extended to consider rural-urban flows where the wage profiles can be
asymmetric.
At an individual level, migration may be seen as a means of acquiring an income that
is higher, or more predictable, or both.  The gains from migration accrue to the
individual.  However, in the context of household migration, the gains from migration
also include the benefits of income pooling.  In this sense, even though only one
individual member migrates, it is the household attitude to risk that dominates.  Thus,
migration may be brought forward precisely because it is part of the risk diversifying
strategy of the household.  The region of inertia at household level could be expected
to be narrower than at the individual level.  This may be because access to the funds
required for migration is already available, or because the household may have access
to some form of credit.  Moreover, in the event that migration turns out to be an
unsuccessful investment, returning is always a feasible option, provided the costs of
return can be met.  In many developing countries, it is likely that individual migration
tends to be the outcome of a household strategy to pool income.
The generality of the approach allows for an examination of international migration.
The costs of migrating abroad are higher than domestically, but the issue of
uncertainty is just as relevant.  Moreover, the real options model can explain episodes
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of large-scale forced migration, such as Ireland during the nineteenth century famine,
which triggered mass emigration to the United States (see O’Rourke, 1991, 1995).
There is ample evidence of forced migration on a large scale as a result of war, famine
or both.  Distress migration can be analysed in terms of the extremely large and very
prolonged uncertainty over the wage in the area of origin.  Alternatively, income in
the area of origin can be expected to assume very low values with near certainty.  In
either case, the optimal strategy is to move away from the source of distress.
Uneven distribution of income is a feature common to many poor countries.  For
many people access to formal institutions for the purposes of obtaining funds for
migration is limited.  However, the presence of informal credit markets may provide
individuals with access to some form of credit.  Often, the labour and credit markets
are interlinked.  Future research intends to consider the funding of migration in the
informal credit market.  This would also permit an analysis of the heterogeneity of
potential migrants, the type of credit they obtain being a function of the assets they
own and of other household characteristics.
A further area of research is to analyse the general equilibrium consequences of
migration, both in the area of origin and in the area of destination.  This implies that
the stochastic processes defining the wage differentials become endogenous.
This paper shows that uncertainty is a fundamental component of the migration
decision.  Whilst wage differentials are important, they are neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for migration to take place.  Uncertainty can in some instances
dominate the propensity to migrate more than the presence of a positive wage
differential.
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Table 1. Interest rate, uncertainty and the wage gap.
0.01 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
r
0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
      0.1 1.476 1.467 1.458 1.458 1.468 1.492 1.529 1.580 1.645 1.725 1.821
      0.2 1.857 1.844 1.831 1.821 1.817 1.821 1.834 1.857 1.892 1.937 1.994
      0.3 2.249 2.234 2.217 2.202 2.191 2.187 2.189 2.199 2.219 2.248 2.287
      0.4 2.668 2.650 2.629 2.610 2.595 2.585 2.580 2.582 2.593 2.611 2.639
σv  0.5 3.119 3.098 3.073 3.051 3.031 3.017 3.007 3.003 3.007 3.019 3.039
      0.6 3.608 3.584 3.555 3.528 3.505 3.486 3.472 3.464 3.462 3.468 3.482
      0.7 4.138 4.111 4.078 4.047 4.020 3.997 3.979 3.967 3.961 3.962 3.971
      0.8 4.714 4.682 4.645 4.610 4.579 4.552 4.530 4.514 4.504 4.502 4.507
      0.9 5.338 5.302 5.261 5.222 5.186 5.156 5.130 5.110 5.097 5.091 5.093
      1 6.014 5.974 5.928 5.884 5.845 5.810 5.781 5.757 5.741 5.732 5.731
Note:  I = 0.5, E = 0.5.
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Appendix
From Section 2.
The Bellman equation (3) from the text can be expanded by using Itô's Lemma:
(A1) odF 22
2
)(
2
1 dV
V
FdV
V
Fdt
t
F OOO
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
++=
vv
O
vv
O
vvv dzVFdtFV
222
2
1
εσσ +=
Taking expectations of (A1) we have:
(A2) dtFVdFE Ovvv
O 22
2
1)( σ=
Replacing (A2) into (3) the Bellman equation becomes:
(A3) dtFVdtWdtrF Ovvv
OO 22
2
1
σ+=
Dividing (A3) by dt a 2nd-order differential equation in FO(V) is obtained:
(A4) OOOvvv WrFFV −=−
22
2
1
σ
The solution to (A4) is given by the sum of the general solution for the homogeneous
equation and of a particular solution for the inhomogeneous equation.  Therefore, a
solution for the homogeneous equation must first be found:
(A5) 0
2
1 22
=−
OO
vvv rFFVσ
Using a guess solution of the form:
(A6) βAVF O =
implies
(A6a) 1−= ββAVF Ov
(A6b) 2)1( −−= βββ AVF Ovv
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Substituting (A6) and (A6b) into the homogeneous equation (A5) and dividing by
βAV leads to:
(A7) 0)1(
2
1 2
=−− rv ββσ
The roots of the quadratic equation (A7) are:
(A8a) 12
4
1
2
1
21 >++=
v
r
σ
β
(A8b) 02
4
1
2
1
22 <+−=
v
r
σ
β
The general solution for the homogeneous equation (A4) is:
(A9) 21 21)(
ββ VAVAVF O +=
A particular solution for the inhomogeneous equation (A4) takes the form:
(A10) KVF O =)(
where K is a constant.  Replacing (A10) into the differential equation (A4) gives:
(A11)
r
WK
O
=
The general solution for the second-order inhomogeneous differential equation (A4) is
thus given by:
(A12)
r
WVAVAVF
O
O ++= 21 21)(
ββ ),0( HVV ∈
Consider A2.  As 0→V , −∞→− OD WW  and therefore the option to migrate should
be worthless.  Since 02 <β , in order to avoid ∞→)(VF O  as 0→V , A2 must be set
to equal zero, i.e.  A2=0.  Hence,
(A13)
r
WVAVF
O
O += 11)(
β ),0( HVV ∈
Problem b can be solved similarly to obtain:
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(A14)
r
WVCVF
D
D += 22)(
β ),( +∞∈ LVV
To determine A1 and C2 the value matching and smooth pasting conditions are used.
The value matching conditions for the problems indicated above are:
(A15) IVFVF HDHO −= )()(
(A16) EVFVF LOLD −= )()(
Equations (A15) and (A16) say that, a household in a particular location must be
indifferent between remaining and migrating minus the associated cost.
The smooth pasting conditions are:
(A17) )()( HDv
HO
v VFVF =
(A18) )()( LOv
LD
v VFVF =
Equations (A17) and (A18) say that, at the critical boundaries, the value functions for
the household in the village of origin and for the household in the village of
destination must be tangential to each other.
Since OD WVW += ln  and by using (A13) and (A14), one obtains:
(A19) 111 1)(
−
=
ββ VAVF Ov
(A20)
rV
VCVF Dv
1)( 122 2 +=
−ββ
By replacing (A13), (A14), (A19) and (A20) into (A15)-(A18) the following system
of equations for A1, C2, VL and VH is obtained:
(A21) I
r
W
r
VVC
r
WVA
OH
H
O
H
−++=+
ln
21
21
ββ
(A22) E
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WVA
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(A23) H
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1
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(A24) L
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rV
VCVA 1122
1
11
21 += −− ββ ββ
The system (A21)-(A24) is non-linear in the variables A1, C2, VL and VH.  In order to
solve it, the methods illustrated in Dixit (1991) are adapted.  Using (A23) and (A24)
to solve for A1 and C2 gives:
(A25)
)( 2112
22
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1 ββββ
ββ
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VVVVr
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−
−
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(A26)
)( 2112
11
2
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ββ
β LHLH
LH
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Let )( 2112 ββββ LHLH VVVVK −≡ .  Replace A1 and C2 into equations (A21) and (A22)
and adding gives:
(A27) )()/ln())()(( 2121121122 EIKrVVKVVVV
LHLHLH +−=−−−− ββββββββββ
Define:
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Then:
(A30)
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(A31) zH MeV =
(A32) zL MeV −=
Replacing (A29)-(A32) into (A27) and simplifying obtains:
(A33) =−−−−− −−−− )(2))()(( 21121122 2112
ββββββββ ββββ zzzzzzzz eeeezeeee
))(( 211221 EIeeeer
zzzz +−−= −− ββββββ
Use 2/)()sinh( xx eex −−=  (see e.g. Smirnov, chapter 17) to obtain:
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(A34) =−⋅−⋅⋅− ))(sinh(2)sinh()sinh()(2 12211212 ββββββββ zzzz
)())(sinh( 1221 EIzr +⋅−⋅−= ββββ
Equation  (A34) can be evaluated by using a fourth-order Taylor expansion about the
point z=0, noting that )cosh(/)sinh( xdxxd =  and )sinh(/)cosh( xdxxd =  where
2/)()cosh( xx eex −+=  (Smirnov, chapter 17), to obtain:
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Using Cardano’s formula (see Kurosh, chapter 9), the cubic equation (A35) has one
real root and two complex conjugate roots.  The real root of the equation is:
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Since D<0, the cubic equation has one real root and two complex conjugate roots.  Let
(A39) 3
1082
Dq
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(A40) 3
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The real root for y is:
(A41) γα +=y
The real root for z can therefore be written as:
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By the chain rule,
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From Section 4.
The Bellman equation is:
(A47) )]([)()( VdFEdtWUdtVrF O +=
Using Itô’s Lemma, taking expectations, replacing into the Bellman equation and
rearranging the following second-order differential equation in the value function
F(V) is obtained:
28
(A48) )(
2
1 22 O
vvv WUrFFV −=−σ
Proceeding as in section 2, the general solution for the inhomogeneous equation
(A48) is:
(A49)
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ββ *),0( VV ∈
where 11 >β  and 02 <β  are defined in equations (A5a) and (A5b) respectively, and
where V* is the critical threshold of the wage differential.
The optimal migration strategy must have the form:  do not migrate if *),0( VV ∈ ,
migrate if )*,[ ∞∈ VV . The general solution for the differential equation (A48) is:
(A50)
r
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The values of the coefficient A1 and of the critical threshold V* are obtained from the
value-matching and the smooth-pasting condition.  Under risk aversion, the value-
matching condition is:
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and the smooth-pasting condition is:
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